Newroz pictures – 2013


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Where possible I have linked the source of the image. Just click on the image to be taken there.



Kurds in Western Kurdistan (Syria) – photo by David Meseguer

– Qamishlo

This would be classified as a provocateur-terrorist under Turkish law apparently.

Kurds with Arabs and Turkmen in Kirkuk


Newroz in Colemerg (Hakkari)

Fighter lighting a fire


Kurdistan Rojhelat (Iran), number reads 2713, the year.







Elih/ Batman










Happy Newroz!


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For information on Newroz, please see this previous post.

Here are some videos of Newroz in several places across Kurdistan- Hawler (Erbil), Slemani, Akre, Amed (Diyarbakir), and Van.

Kurds in the twilight of the Ottoman Empire


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*For this section, I heavily referenced from Chapter 6 of “A Modern History of the Kurds” by McDowall.

As the Ottoman Empire entered into the 20th century political agitation began to increase as it became obvious that the Ottoman Empire was no longer a relevant power in world politics, having a tenuous status as a regional power at best. A big downgrade from being a major player in the world only a few centuries before with no sign of abating. Nationalism was increasing in the empire, which was particularly pronounced in the Armenian population in the Middle-East and subjects in the few holdings the Ottomans held onto in the Balkans.

This set up the scene for a coup by the Young Turks in July of 1908, which saw the restoration of the short-lived 1876 Constitution and its associated parliament. This also meant the rise to power of the political wing of the Young Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress (in Turkish, the  İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), sometimes referred to as Ittihadists. Kurds, like other minorities, welcomed the change in the government as a way to possibly advance their demands as a new state was in the process of being born. While some local tribal leaders were obviously disadvantaged by the shift away from decentralization and a clientele network that was common in Abdul Hamid II’s rule, it provided Kurdish nationalists with a possibly receptive government to work towards future plans. This meant the return of several Kurdish figures who were until then in exile or ignored by the government, like Ubeydullah’s son, Abdul Qadir, and several of the Badr Khans.

While the Young Turk Coup ensured the Committees of Union and Progress’s uncontested control in the government, this did not translate into immediate stability. Before the coup, the Ottoman Empire had to deal with the embarrassment of having to watch as the Austro-Hungarian Empire annexed Bosnia, a consequence of its defeat in the last war with the Russian Empire back in the late 1870s, around the time of Ubeydullah’s uprising. In the months after the coup, the Young Turks fended off political challeneges from conservative elements in the state, among them old Kurdish tribal chiefs, notably one Ibrahim Pasha of the Milli tribal confederation, who rose up in an abortive rebellion after the Young Turk Revolution at the cost of his life. Some of these conservative elements within the military launched their own counter-coup in March of 1909 attempting to throw out the Young Turks. This failed and led to the abdication of Sultan Abdul Hamid II in favor of Mehmed V.

And of course, Europe was not ignoring the developments in the Empire. The Ottoman Empire was attacked by the Kingdom of Italy in a conflict that lasted from September 29, 1911 to October 18, 1912. Like the annexation of Bosnia before, this was tied to a claim by Italy that they had been promised Libya by the powers of Europe in the aftermath of the last Russian-Ottoman conflict. The war’s conclusion saw the loss of Libya to the Italians, and this conflict in turn provoked the First Balkan War, which saw the final collapse of influence of the Ottomans in the region, including the independence of its last Balkan vilayet in Albania. The Second Balkan War followed almost immediately afterwards, but it was a conflict in which the Ottomans were a secondary factor.

The Kurdish population in the Ottoman Empire had yet to coalesce around a single political figure, though there were certainly nationalists around this time fighting for more Kurdish recognition in the empire. Many of these Kurds originated from older families that had been in positions of power before the disintegration of their semi-autonomous emirates, as they were typically able to access more information and education that gave them a “big picture” on the Kurdish issue.

This is not to say that Kurdish insurrection was nonexistent at the time, but after Ubeydullah any sort of disturbance that occurred was typically confined to local insurrections that were often quelled before they grew out of control by finding the leaders of the movement.

One of the families that was noted for this was the Badrkhans, both among those still living with the Ottoman Empire and those living in exile. One of the more notable actions was the foundation of the “Kurdistan” newspaper in Egypt by Midhad Badrkhan, one of the sons of the elder Badrkhan. On April 22nd, 1898, a newspaper simply titled as “Kurdistan” was published in Cairo by Midhad, marking the first truly Kurdish publication. As such April 22nd is typically recognized as an official anniversary for Kurdish journalism.

The first page of the Kurdistan Newspaper

The script used in this particular issue is Ottoman Turkish, an Arabic script adapted for the form of Turkish used in the Empire (Note also the use of the hijri as the method of time. When Kurdish was used, it was typically Kurmanji, the dialect most familiar to the majority of Kurds living in the Ottoman Empire’s borders. Midhad himself, acting as editor-in-chief of the paper, wrote this following passage in the paper:


They [the Kurds] are not aware of what is happening in the world and in their neighbourhood. I have put myself to the task of producing this newspaper-God willing-every fifteen days. I have named it ‘Kurdistan.’ In this newspaper I emphasise the importance of education and science. Wherever there are great schools and institutions I shall report to the Kurds. I shall also inform the Kurds about any war that is taking place, about the deeds of the great imperial countries, how they fight and how they trade. No one has ever produced a newspaper like this, mine is a pathfinder.

Midhad Badrkhan was indeed correct- no one before him had ever produced a newspaper before that concerned itself with the issues of Kurds, nor were Kurds aware of the world around the,. The use of Ottoman Turkish was also probably used as a means to better communicate to both the community of Ottoman exiles living in Europe as well as Kurdish notables living in Istanbul and other cities in the Ottoman Empire. There was no concrete or agreed upon Kurdish alphabet then, one that would not be widely accepted until another Badrkhan- Jeladat- would create a Latin-based script in 1932 while in Syria.

As such the movement for an independent Kurdistan seemed to have been largely confined to more educated and elite sections of Kurdish society. It did not help either that there was no concrete position of Kurds here, often with rivalries developing between different figures, notably the Badrkhan exiles and the former nobility who remained in the Ottoman Empire and tried to work within the existing system. This manifested itself in what would become the closest things Kurds had to an organization for their voices in the Ottoman Empire- The Society for the Rise and Progress of Kurdistan (also referred to as the Kurdish Society for Progress
and Mutual Aid). The founders of this group included Amin Ali Badr Khan (one of Badr Khan’s sons), Sheikh Abdul Qadir Nehri (again, one of Ubeydullah’s sons), General Muhammad Sharif Pasha (a Baban who was supportive of decentralist positions). The inclusion of a Badr Khan in this group marked the beginning of which some of the family returned from exile, most notably with the movement of the newspaper Kurdistan to Istanbul. However, this led to some friction between Abdul Qadir and the Badr Khans in the organization, with both trying to utilize their strengths to increase their standing in the organization.

A sister cultural organization was also set up under the name of “Society for the Propagation of Kurdish Education” under the direction of Abdulrahman Badrkhan, which also ran a school to educate people in Kurdish. Said Nursi, who would go onto be a scholar focused more on Islamic theology, was also involved in this school trying to emphasize the role of Islam in helping Kurds transcend tribal rivalries into a more cohesive unit, and more importantly, achieving a degree of harmony with other peoples in the Empire.

With the exception of General Muhammad Sharif Pasha, the Kurds in this organization had sympathies towards the Young Turk movement in the Ottoman Empire, which manifested itself as the Committees of Union and Progress as a political force. The Young Turks could be described as a source of reformist agitation in the Ottoman Empire, seeking modernization in the decaying structures and to reform the Empire into a constitutional monarchy with a functioning bureaucracy. Like any political movement, the Young Turks found themselves divided among more liberal members who favored an inclusionist, multi-ethnic, and more decentralized empire as opposed to the more Turkish nationalist minded ones who wanted a stronger, unitary one.

It could be said that the division among Kurds at the time was to be one repeated in future generations- whether to work within the system or rise in rebellion, whether to push for autonomy or for outright independence, and who to work with in pursuing their goals. And then there were Kurds who fought to preserve their old tribal ways, as was seen after the 1908 coups by several groups, notably the Barzinjis (including a younger Mahmud Barzinji), and the Barzanis.

More problematic of course were several Kurds who did not want to involve themselves in a movement at all and preferred to assimilate into areas which would help them out the best in their own narrow interests. And of course there is the case of Ziya Gokalp, who was born into a Kurdish family in Diyarbakir and later became the ideological father of Turkish nationalism and promulgator of Turanism in the empire, which would become instruments of oppression on Kurds. Gokalp, like other urban Kurds, were embarrassed of their identity and viewed Kurdish culture as a brutal and backwards lifestyle rather than a distinct identity. While Gokalp is probably the most dramatic example of an assimilated Kurd, he was far from the only one.

The Kurds, like other minorities, in time found themselves at odds with the new Young Turk government as it became clear that its nationalist and militarist elements were becoming more pronounced. As the Young Turk government struggled with the Balkan Wars, it became more concerned with expressions of nationalism from other minorities in its empire as a potential foreign plot to destabilize the empire.

The government showed concern with attempted Kurdish overtures to Armenian groups, an odd occurrence considering their usual antipathy. Abdul Qadir Nehri, speaking to an Armenian group, apparently put the CUP at unease (despite his own loyal membership in the group) with mentions of identity and stolen land. Armenian revolutionaries, such as the Dashnaks, were seen trying to communicate with discontent Hamidiyah chiefs in an attempt to form alliances against the Ottoman Empire. There were open signs of dissent, such as Sheikh Abdul Salam of Barzan who along with a Nur Muhammad of Duhok, had raised the demand to the government for some reforms. While asking for some installation of religious laws, the more remarkable aspect was  the demand for the use of Kurdish in administrative and educational fields, which had not been raised until then by previous Kurds. And this would, in effect, start a long line of nationalist revolts started by other Barzanis.

Sheikh Abdul Salam Barzani in 1908, seated center in white.

The Badr Khans too were also working their old connections, creating a network of discontent local notables. It also appeared that the Ottomans were worried about Russian intrigue, with some Kurds talking of the possibility of becoming a protectorate under the Russian Empire along with the Armenians. Among the strongest advocates of this was Abdul Razzaq Badrkhan (who was exiled from the Ottoman Empire after a fatal feud with an Ottoman noble), then in Northwestern Iran cooperating with Simko Shikak in rallying Kurds against the decaying Qajar Empire and sending out messengers to Kurds in the Ottoman Empire to do the same and cooperate with Russia.

It was then that the Young Turk government was apparently moved to try and disrupt the Kurds, resorting to a form of the clientele system seen under the Hamidiyah calvary, resurrecting them in all but name and even deploying them to stop insurrections in Albania during the Balkan War and in tribal uprisings in the Arabian peninsula. To check against attempts by some Kurds to cooperate with Armenians or Russia, the CUP manipulated religious messages of its predecessors to ensure that Kurds remained loyal to the capital. They then focused on playing the personalities of the Kurdish movement against one another, releasing Abdul Qadir from jail and ensuring his cooperation, while focusing on activities of the Badrkhans in the east which they managed to keep from spreading outside of Kurdish areas.

Another coup would take place in the Ottoman Empire in 1913 after the defeat in the First Balkan War. As the government was preparing to give into stiff concessions demanded by the European backers of the Balkan League, a group of Young Turks burst into a meeting of the government. The minister of war, Nazim Pasha, was shot and killed by Enver Pasha, a Young Turk general, and the Grand Vizier Kâmil Pasha was forced out of power. This in effect created a triumvirate of sorts among the new Interior Minister, Talaat Pasha, Enver Pasha as Minister of War, and Djemal Pasha as Minister of the Navy. The CUP then strengthened its authority against external and internal threats, and this meant that in particular its minorities, notably Armenians, Arabs, and Kurds, were viewed with suspicion. The government would become considerably more nationalist during this period.

The Empire could then focus on more local insurrections, such as that of Abdul Salam Barzani who had apparently linked up with Abdul Razzaq Badrkhan. The insurrection was neutralized in much the same way that the Ottomans had done before- playing tribal rivalries against each other. Sheikh Abdul Salam was eventually captured in 1914 and executed along with several other Barzanis. Likewise another uprising took place by another Sheikh, Mulla Salim, in the Bitlis area, which was also unable to go anywhere.

Of interest here is that it is in this period of upheaval that Mulla Mustafa Barzani (a brother of Abdul Salam) was born, and it was this experience of Abdul Salam and his subsequent execution, as well as the imprisonment of much of his family, that would move him towards nationalist sentiment. The title of Sheikh would pass to Ahmad Barzani, who would go on to launch uprisings of his own later.

For those of you slightly familiar with history, 1914 is also the year World War I kicked off. The Ottoman Empire would join in this war and thus come into conflict with Russia once more, which made possibilities of Kurds being co-opted by Russian interests all the more serious. The First World War would bring great tumult and tragedy to the region, and would set up the groundwork for the modern Kurdish independence movement.

The Kelashin Stele


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I have an update incoming, but I thought it would be nice to share this picture of the Kelashin Stele, an object dating back to the ancient Kingdom of Urartu. Urartu existed in roughly what is the Kurdish and Armenian regions of the Middle-East currently, that is in political terms Eastern Turkey, Northern Iraq, Northwestern Iran, and the Southern Caucasus during the years of 860 BC–590 BC. Urartu was conquered by the Median Empire in its expansion into the Middle East. Due to its presence in Kurdish regions, Urartu is often listed as one of the “indigenous” ancient groups that played a role in the ethnogenesis of the modern Kurdish people, along with Aryan groups and Islamic conquest.

Kelashin in Kurdish is a combination of two words. “Kel” can refer to a variety of things ranging from a tombstone to marker, but is generally understood to be treated with respect. “Shin” is blue, and refers to the dark hue of the stone the stele is made from. This is sometimes translated as a “Blue Holy Stone”, or at least as wikipedia puts it as.

The inscription is in both Urartian and Assyrian, and commemorates the conquest of an Assyrian city, Musasir, or Ardini in Urartian. The exact location of this city is speculated, but the Stele itself is located in an eponymous village in Iraqi Kurdistan on the border with Iran. You can view the region in google maps by clicking here. During the war against Iraq by the peshmerga in the 1980s, the Kelashin area was one of the routes used for peshmerga entering into the region. Many of them were familiar with the stele as a landmark, and did have their picture taken with as follows below.

The images that follow were taken by Dr. Mohamad Salah Gomah, who has chronicled Kurdish history with his photography, covering the 1960s through to the early part of the last decade, especially the activities of the peshmerga and the KDP.

Click on an image to enlarge it.

Hamidiye Cavalry


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After Sheikh Ubeydullah’s downfall, Kurdish insurrections lessened in occurrence and were only limited to local outbreaks. The cost of rebellion had become too high for many residents, and few leaders emerged to expand the tensions with the government beyond local issues. Certain groups resorted to brigandry and resistance against the government, and caused harsh retaliation upon them. One such example was the Hamewand tribe that lives around Chamchamal, many of whom were deported to Ottoman Libya and Adana in 1889. Interestingly, even among those deported to Libya, they gradually made their way back to their ancestral homes over the next 10 years.

The Ottoman Empire however still struggled to find a substitute for the emirates they had disbanded to integrate the Kurds more effectively into the increasingly more unitary Empire. The Emirates, while not completely under the control of the Ottomans, at least afforded a degree of stability that the Ottomans could not achieve otherwise in its current, more unitary style of governance.

One solution was one that would be repeated for many decades afterwards, and had already been done before- co-opting Kurdish notables to help them in administrating the realm. The Ottoman Sultan at the time, Abdul Hamid II, ruled at a time when the Ottoman Empire was in deep decline, and further cemented its reputation as the “Sick Man of Europe” as it began to collapse from the Balkans and suffered internal insurrections. Abdul Hamid II sought a different approach with the ever troublesome Kurdish tribes by finding a way to incorporate them as partners rather than ruling over them.

Kurdish lords, encouraged by ties of a common religion, received important positions in the new order and indeed some were related to previous rebel leaders. Kendal Nezan provides several such examples in his contribution to “A People without a Country” on page 25- a son of Badirkhan, Bahri Bey, found himself as an assistant to the Sultan. Abdul Qadir, Ubeydullah’s son, was President of the Ottoman Senate in 1908 and later on the Ottoman Council of State (the ministries). Even the descendants of the Baban Emirate found ways to be accepted in the new order.

However, not all Kurds could feasibly be incorporated into the ruling structure without obviously upsetting the dominance that the government had over the region. Moreover, what could be done about the numerous smaller lords and notables? This issue was important for the Ottoman Empire to resolve as it was interwoven with their own grasp on their frontier regions.

The answer to this dilemma emerged from the the Ottoman Empire’s erstwhile enemies, the Russians. The Russian Empire, much like the Ottoman Empire, was filled with many ethnic and religious groups, and administration was (mostly) through a Russian-centric bureaucracy, much like the Turkish-centric one in the Ottoman Empire. For a long time the Russians had employed the Cossack Calvary units to help it keep order in its frontier regions along the Caucasus and Central Asia, granting them a great deal of autonomy in exchange for maintaining the Russian Empire’s territorial claims along the Ottoman border. The Ottoman Empire saw the need for a similar unit along its Russian border where Armenian rebellions were becoming more and more frequent, and so they sent off an edict in November 1890 announcing the formation of these special cavalry units. Taking their name from Abdul Hamid, the cavalry were known as the Hamidiye.

The Hamidiye drew people from various backgrounds in the Ottoman Empire, but it was distinguished by being one of the first organized Kurdish units within the Ottoman Empire. Kurds had served in the Ottoman military long before- they are known to have been deployed against Albanian insurrections in the 1800s and with other disturbances in the Balkans before that. The importance of the Hamidiye were that they were commanded and organized by Kurdish notables along tribal and family lines, and this meant by extension that for the first time Kurds were exposed to military tactics and protocol that they were not accustomed to. The exposure to these from their education played a role in fermenting Kurdish identity later down the road.

The Ottoman Empire used the Hamidiye in different occupations, but it was in the eastern parts of the Empire they got recognition internationally. As you might already guess though, this reputation was hardly desirable, and much like previous coverage of Kurdish issues at the time. Some examples follow:



The events take place in the 1890s, where the first major conflict between Armenian fighters (Dashnaks) and the Ottoman Empire took place, culminating in killings of thousands of civilians that foreshadowed the genocide that would take place 20 years later. The Hamidiye were utilized here, being the major force in the region, to fight against Armenian fighters who were believed to be supported by the Russian Empire. Here the Hamidiye showed another source of value to the Ottoman Empire- plausible deniability. As it had done before, the Ottoman authorities could blame these disturbances on local “brigands” rather than any policy of its own and distance itself from more unsavory policies.

The focus of the Hamidiye in this capacity ignores what other ways it affected Kurdish people. As I mentioned before, the exposure of Kurds to a more organized military structure and the education along with that played a major role in exposing a generation of Kurds to the liberal values and nationalism. Of course there were others who simply utilized this position for their own benefit, and indeed continued to benefit from a treacherous relationship with the later Republic in Ankara. At the same time though, there were others that would take their training to create a basis to Kurdish rebellions in the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and onwards.

This being said, on the whole the Hamidiye were more or less following the whims of the Ottoman authorities, having been deployed not only to put down Armenian insurrections, but disturbances that occurred in Southern Kurdistan (modern day northern Iraq) as well as among the Kurds of Dersim and Arab tribes. The loyalty to their family and tribal units were matched only by their devotion to the Sultan due to his standing as the Caliph, which would have the consequence of hampering Kurdish identity from within the Empire. As such, the passionate calls for Kurdish self-determination often came from intellectuals either attempting to pursue reform from within the Ottoman administration, or those who had gone into exile such as the Badirkhans.

Happy Birthday!


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And no, this isn’t my birthday, but rather the birthday of a significant amount of people living in Southern Kurdistan/ Iraqi Kurdistan. While July 1st may have grabbed their attention due to the Euro 2012 Final (and man, the Italy fans must be pissed), for older Kurds who were born in Iraq, it was their birthday.

But how could July 1st be the birthday of so many Kurds? As a young child I did not give much thought as to why both my mother and father shared the same birthday, July 1st. I simply thought it was a coincidence and left it at that, and I would continue believing that until I saw that about every single one of my uncles and aunts were also born on July 1st.

I was probably 12 or so when I asked my father why they were all born on the same day. About this time I had begun to be aware of my Kurdish roots and exactly what it was my parents went through when I was in Iraq. My father explained to me then that they had all been registered that way in the Iraqi government. I didn’t give it much thought then, but as I learned more about the way Kurds had lived in Iraq, the reason for this became more clear. There was another aspect to this that involved the marginalized position Kurds occupied in Iraq since its creation.

When Iraq had began as a Kingdom, the central government mainly relied on forming close ties with the local notables more than providing any sort of services to the people beyond collecting taxes. Public education was nonexistent, and the isolation of people from the central government was probably the greatest in the Kurdish region of Iraq, where villagers tucked away in the sleepy countryside did not give much thought to the central government. As insurrections against Baghdad came and went, the people had become more distrustful of the  authorities and avoided any interaction with them. Consequently, many Kurds went by unregistered and thus the government could always release very low figures of Kurdish population figures from those few in the cities like Mosul, Hawler, and Kirkuk that did bother to register.

If a Kurd registered with the government, they could risk many problems- if they were wanted by the authorities for participating in a revolt or otherwise fighting the government in some way, going through to register themselves and their family would have invited arrest. Other Kurds who may have been more nationalistic minded may have balked at the idea of registering themselves as a citizen of a nation that had oppressed and ignored their rights. Some had, in between the numerous revolts and the uprooting that caused, had their mind on more important matters. Ultimately, registering as a citizen brought little advantages to them, as they had seen little benefit from tax collection, no public schools, infrastructure development, no hospitals, nothing.

This trend carried on into the 1950s, where tensions between Kurdish liberation groups and the monarchy grew and many people did not trust the government which they had seen by that point as only interested in serving the needs of the British and the Hashemites. When the coup against the monarchy occurred on July 14th, 1958, a Republican government under the leadership of Colonel Abdul-Karim Qassim was created. In the years afterwards, even after the overthrow of Qassim and the reign of the Arif brothers in much of the 60s and the Ba’ath later on, the government attempted to register all Iraqi citizens, a matter they saw as important in creating a modern administration. Kurds who took up this offer found that they were, many times, unaware of where their birthday would be by the modern calendar. Westerners may take it for granted with the association around a birthday, but for many people outside of Europe and United States in those times it was not really important to get it down to a day as long as they remember when it occurred. As such most Kurds were aware of what year they were born in and roughly what season and sometimes month it was in- this was the way most Kurds recognized the passage of time. Others knew exactly what day they were born in, even by the western calendar reckoning, but this would not be taken into consideration. In the end, a Kurd was more concerned about the family they were born into and their ties to the land more than getting down their birth to a date.

When it came down to the government however, Kurds trying to declare what day they were born on was not important. To expedite the process of registering the hundreds of thousands of Kurds into public record, the government had made everyone born on July 1st. There may have been other “default” days used, but July 1st is the one I am aware of. Consequently whole generations of Kurds found themselves with the same day of birth as a result of the government’s desire to quickly register the large amount of Kurds.

There could be another angle here that once again the Iraqi government had manage to take ownership of yet another aspect of a Kurd’s identity. It would be a common theme starting from the days of the monarchy for any regime in Baghdad to view Kurds as its rightful subjects and nothing more.

Those Kurds that eventually emigrated out of Iraq in the coming years would on their arrival to their new homes in Europe, the Americas, and elsewhere, would show from their identification that they were born in July 1st. Few bothered changing this and as a result many Iraqi Kurds who emigrated out of Iraq before the 1980s tend to share the same birthday. It had almost become an inside joke among the Iraqi Kurd diaspora communities about the many birthdays on July 1st, and even large cakes were made for this occasion. It was interesting to see what had essentially been a cold decision by the Iraqi bureaucracy into another way Kurds could unite around a common experience of oppression, one of many at least.

An odd story- Kurd with lemon arrested for terrorism


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I’m currently writing up the next installment here, concerning the formation of the Hamidye cavalry and the years before the first World War. I saw this story on BBC- rare a Kurdish story ends up on sources outside the Middle-East- which drives home the sheer ridiculousness of the Turkish criminal system. I won’t comment any further because I think you’ll get the idea once you read it:

Turkey: Kurd with lemon accused of supporting terror

A Turkish prosecutor has demanded that a Kurdish man who is deaf, illiterate and unable to speak be jailed for 25 years for supporting terrorism.

Possession of a half-lemon was cited as evidence against Mehmet Tahir Ilhan. Lemon can ease the effects of tear gas.

Mr Ilhan is charged with making propaganda for the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) and with taking part in an illegal organisation.

Mr Ilhan, a bazaar porter from the city of Mersin, denies the charges.

Using sign language at a hearing in the south-eastern city of Adana, he said he had got caught up in a violent pro-Kurdish demonstration.

Under Turkey’s anti-terrorism law it is an offence to show any sign of support for the PKK.
Laws criticised

The BBC’s Jonathan Head in Istanbul says Turkey’s judiciary often administers harsh penalties on bafflingly slight evidence.

However, even by Turkish standards, this case is extraordinary, he says.

If Mr Ilhan is found guilty, the court is expected to pass a sentence close to the 25 years that the prosecutor has asked for.

Over the past 18 months, hundreds of Kurdish activists, journalists and politicians have been detained under anti-terrorism legislation.

The use of Turkey’s anti-terrorism laws has been widely criticised. The Council of Europe said it was having a “chilling effect” on freedom of speech.

Our correspondent says the Turkish government is trying to encourage Kurdish moderates with such concessions as Kurdish language classes in school, while at the same time isolating the more hard-line PKK members.

But the sometimes incomprehensible actions of its judiciary will inevitably undermine such efforts, he adds.


Participating in Kurdish demonstrations, particularly those that get into confrontations with police, creates a pretext for police to throw people into jail for supporting “terrorism”. Many people in Kurdish areas of Turkey have fallen to this in the past year, despite the government’s claims of making an “opening” to Kurds. No one is free from this- even children. The evidence thrown in later, like this brother’s lemon, just adds to the ridiculous nature of the oppression Kurds face in Turkey. More idiotic is the world’s continued silence towards the Kurdish issue.

Sheikh Ubeydullah’s Revolt


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In the years that followed the defeats of Badrkhan and Yezdan Sher, the Kurdish regions of the Ottoman Empire experienced a profound change in their social structures. The tribes, while previously already powerful, were checked by the presence of the Mirs of the various Emirates in the kingdom. Badrkhan’s defeat marked the beginning of the end of the Kurdish emirates, the last holdout being Baban’s which quietly ended in 1850. As such, the tribes now began to occupy an increasingly more important position in Kurdish culture, some being swelled by the remnants of the regional Mir’s families taking prominence in their circles.

The most prominent feature of many of the tribes was their religiosity. Many tribes were part of Naqshbandi circles, Sufi orders, in which the tribal chieftains were both spiritual and political leaders in their localities. One such figure was Sheikh Ubeydullah of Nehri, sometimes spelled as Obeidullah or erroneously as Sheikh Abdullah, hailing from the eponymous Nehri (renamed Baglar by the Turkish state) in Şemdinli, Hakkari province of Turkey. Ubeydullah’s family were, like other tribes and notables in the Ottoman Empire, large landowners who had often held strong relations with the Sultan- so long as their economic interests were maintained of course. The Nehri cheiftans for their part were known for their tobacco, but their Naqshbandi circle also was fairly strong with adherents not just from their local region but from tribes in Mesopotamia and even Iran.

The Kurdish regions in the Ottoman Empire also suffered, like the other parts of the Empire, from warfare and large scale famines which killed thousands of people. The most notable disorders occurred in the 1870s where rather strong famines led Kurds and other citizens to resort to banditry to survive from bad crop failures. Indeed such disorders were rampant enough to even reach the attention of western papers, though true to fashion they were once again only worried with the fate of Armenians, Assyrians, and other Christian groups in the Empire.

The most notable event during this time was yet another war between the Ottoman and Russian Empire from 1877 to 1878. It may be recalled that earlier, Yezdan Sher took advantage of an earlier Russo-Turkish conflict (the Crimean War) during his uprising in 1855. The war would also provide Sheikh Ubeydullah with his own opening, but unlike Badirkhan and Yezdan Sher before him, he would do it in the aftermath of such a conflict rather than in the middle of it.

Painting by the Russian artist Lev Lagorio depicting Russian soldiers defending against an Ottoman counterattack on occupied Beyazid

The war had a profound effect on the Ottoman Empire. The devastation the Russian army did on the Ottoman military killed many conscripts which left a void in many villages. Russian assaults from the Caucasus targeted the Ottoman territories around Kars and Beyazid (Bazîd in Kurdish, was also the site of a Bazîd Emirate) wreaked havoc on the people living there. Russia, under pressure from the British, accepted a peace treaty from the Ottoman Empire, which while spared the Ottomans from a more devastating defeat, was humiliating nonetheless.

The Ottoman influence in the Balkans was virtually eliminated as it had to recognize the independence of Bulgaria and Romania as part of its peace agreements with the Russian Empire. The city of Kars and its vicinity was ceded to the Russian Empire, and would remain under occupation by the Russians until after World War I in the treaty of friendship between the young Turkish republic and the Soviet Union. The war’s devastation on the local economy, which was already on top of an ongoing famine, certainly did not help things.

Sheikh Ubeydullah used his considerable tribal connections and religious influence to form a core of rebellion against the Ottoman Empire. The widespread famine and instability as local officials took extreme measures to exploit local villagers. It is into this climate that Sheikh Ubeydullah emerged and exploited to raise the call for rebellion.

A foreign events section of the New York Times from September of 1879, detailing a Kurdish insurrection which the Ottoman Empire falsely reported as taken care of. From ProQuest Historical Newspapers Database

As the selection from the newspaper above indicates, Ubeydullah was already beginning to cause problems in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans, not willing to show a further sign of weakness after its defeat, announced that there was no problem and that they had taken care of the insurrection. Once again the Ottomans can not hide the insurrection for too long, and a month later in the New York Times this sensational account appears:

New York Times foreign events from October 1879 issue. ProQuest Historical Newspapers database.

And yet again, the Ottomans extol their false victory some days later.

See a pattern? From the same source as above.

Meanwhile, the famine continued in Kurdish regions, apparently will into 1880.

New York Times newspaper from June of 1880, describing the famine in Kurdish regions of the empire. From ProQuest Historical Newspapers database.

One thing that distinguished Ubeydullah from previous uprisings was, besides his religious background, his understanding that Kurds constituted a distinct group of people in the Ottoman Empire. In his correspondence with a missionary, Sheikh Ubeydullah explicitly mentions the Kurdish people:

“The Kurdish nation, consisting of more than 500,000 families is a people apart. Their religion is different, and their laws and customs distinct…. We are also a nation apart. We want our affairs to be in our hands, so that in the punishment of our own offenders we may be strong and independent, and have privileges like other nations…. This is our objective…. Otherwise, the whole of Kurdistan will take matter into their own hands, as they are unable to put up with these continual evil deeds and the oppression, which they suffer at the hands of the Persian and Ottoman governments.”

Sheikh Ubeydullah (sitting) with an American missionary, Joseph Cochran

Interestingly, unlike what was seen with Mir Kor, Badirkhan, or Yezdan Sher, international press did not seem to be up in arms over harm directed against Christians, which as I’ve shown on previous occasions were often sensationalized for full effect in western press. Ubeydullah appears to have not targeted Christians as heavily, if at all, like his predecessors and indeed it seems some may have been friendly with him. At any rate, this did not seem to improve his image with westerners, unsurprisingly.

Ubeydullah hoped for a Kurdish state, one under his rule of course, which would be independent of both Persia and the Ottoman Empire. Like the Kurdish revolters before him, he wanted to replicate the success of Egypt in breaking away from Ottoman control, and felt that an outside European power would be the answer to this. To this end the United Kingdom looked into ways to support Ubeydullah’s revolt, more to destabilize the empire than to genuinely help Kurds though.

Ubeydullah was first supported by enemies of the Ottoman Empire, like the British, as he focused on the immediate vicinity of his land holdings. However, this ended once Ubeydullah’s raids turned east into the Persian Empire. The reasons for this essentially come down to the relative weakness of Iran and Ubeydullah’s own tit for tat with the Ottoman Empire. He had possibly hoped for the Sultan’s approval of attacking Iran, a long time regional rival. And in a way, it could once again kill two birds with one stone- the Iranians would get some instability, and the inevitable help it would receive from the Russians and other European powers would weaken the Iranians. The invasion of Iran began in the spring of 1880 and would take the world by surprise. Much as they had done in previous occasions, world powers called on the Ottoman Empire to act and reign in their “rebellious” Kurdish elements.

Short article from the New York Times foreign events section in early October of 1880. The Kurdish Chieftain from Turkey is of course either Ubeydullah or someone allied to him. This is the beginning of Ubeydullah’s invasion of Iran. ProQuest Historical Newspapers Database.

Ubeydullah’s invasion of Persia consisted of his followers, including close relatives like his son Abdul Qadir. The first invasion seemingly took the Iranian defenders by surprise, quickly overrunning settlements across the Zagros mountain in Kurdish populated areas, ultimately reaching both Urmia and Mahabad (Saublaq). So powerful was Ubeydullah’s support among the locals and from his own recruits that the Iranians had to muster all the strength they could get, including from foreign support through the British, to repulse Ubeydullah’s attack at Urmia.

A few weeks into October, and the New York Times carries this piece with the wonderful title of “THE INSURGENT KURDS”. The coverage grows, but Ubeydullah is not mentioned yet. Source same as above.

And only five days later “THE INSURGENT KURDS” gets a significantly larger coverage. “Sheikh Abdullah” is Ubeydullah, and the paper carries what readers of this blog should be familiar with by now, with all the sensational accounts of carnage and death.

We have gone from the “KURD INVASION OF PERSIA” to simply the “INVASION OF PERSIA” in this November 1880 article on Ubeydullah’s invasion of Iran. Note that this was on page one, which was rare for Kurdish related events, even to this day. Must have been a slow day, I guess.
Here Ubeydullah’s final attack on Urmia is unsuccessful, and marks the beginning of the end of Ubeydullah’s Iranian campaign. Of interest too is the piece at the end which mentions Ubeydullah punished Kurds for “excesses”.

In this snippet from the New York Times on November 14th, 1880, it covers a battle outside of Sāūjbulāgh (So-Uj-Bolak as the newspaper tried to spell it). Interestingly, it appears that Ubeydullah’s band of Kurds managed to cause the death of the Iranian commander-in-chief in this battle.

In this November 25th article, Ubeydullah is reported to have retreated back into the Ottoman Empire. The Persians draw punishment from Kurds they have captured.

Ubeydullah returned across the frontier to the Ottoman Empire, where he planned for yet another invasion of Iran to take place in the spring. Once word of this plotting reached foreign powers, they called on the Ottomans once again to take care of the problem. This time the Ottomans were more than willing- Ubeydullah had shown he had grown well beyond a nuisance they could redirect against Iran, and instead into one that could be just as problematic on its vulnerable eastern holdings too.

Ubeydullah’s second invasion of Iran in was planned for either the spring or summer of 1881, but never started. When he returned across the border, he set out immediately to instigate Kurds once more. The Ottomans, however, were not willing to stand by with a second invasion taking place that could excite their own Kurdish populations into rebellion Taking up an offer from the Sultan, Ubeydullah departed for the capital in the summer of 1881. Much like previous Kurdish leaders though, what he faced was not a treaty but his arrest. Ubeydullah was exiled to the Ottoman outpost in Mecca the same year, and his followers evaporated away. Collaborators in Iran were put to the sword and killed, while his own family’s holdings were unsurprisingly reduced and their power limited.

In this New York Times piece from April of 1881, Ubeydullah is reported to be causing problems. This is part of his attempt to launch a second assault on Iran. Also note the mention of plague, yet another problem in the region.

This article from April 10th, 1881, is more specific. Here it mentions that Ubeydullah is meeting with other chieftains to organize an assault on Iran.

Woo, Anarchy! By May of 1881, there is yet to be an invasion as the previous article stated, but it’s falling apart over in the eastern realms of the Ottoman Empire, and while Ubeydullah is not mentioned it is in part due to his own actions.

In this piece from May 20th, 1881 in the New York Times, Ubeydullah is mentioned by name again as beginning to organize another invasion of Iran, with the Iranians pleading to the Ottomans to reign in the Kurds.

This New York Times article from June 4th states that Iran executed one of Ubeydullah’s collaborators from the last invasion, one Agha Mukri (a tribe around Mahabad). This is presumably timed to try and dissuade Kurds from joining Ubeydullah again, along with all the other executions.

This New York Times piece from June 10th mentions that Ubeydullah surrendered to the Ottomans before launching his invasion.

And here, in the New York Times of 1881, the Kurds get more executions from the last invasion. Ubeydullah is still not heard from.

From the New York Times, November of 1881. This is a significantly larger piece covering what was going on with the Kurds at the time. The Iranians are displeased with the Ottomans refusal to turn over a Kurdish chieftain who allied with Ubeydullah, as well as Ubeydullah himself. However, Kurdish followers of Ubeydullah are realizing that he was betrayed and that he was not going for negotiations, but has seemingly been imprisoned.

For the Ottomans, the long-term lesson from Ubeydullah’s revolt was that it was clear that the dissolution of the Emirates had resulted in many problems. At the height of Ubeydullah’s urpising, he commanded the loyality of tribes and people encompassing roughly the mountains areas of northern Iraq, Southeastern Turkey up to Diyarbakir in the west and Van in the north, and the Iranian settlements along the border. The Ottomans could not find an alternative to this structure to keep the loyalty of Kurdish chieftains who were still just as detached from the capital, if not more, since the beginning of centralization. A different patronage system would have to be developed, and it is here that the roots of the Hamidyie cavalry were started, which I will mention in depth later.

As for Ubeydullah, he did not live long in exile. Unlike Yezdan Sher whose final date of death I could not find, Ubeydullah is known to have died in exile in 1883 at Mecca. There are some newspapers, one of which I’ve attached below, that show that he died of typhus in November of 1883. With all the fanfare about his atrocities, there is surprisingly little said for Ubeydullah.

Ubeydullah’s Obituary in the New York Times. Via Proquest Historical Newspapers.

Ubeydullah’s legacy would live on as Kurds began to develop an understanding of their own cultural identity and their marginalized position in Ottoman society, continuing to act in the interests of all Kurds. Ubeydullah’s son, Abdulqadir, recognizing the importance of organizing all Kurds, participated in the reform-oriented Committee of Union and Progress with other Kurdish notables and was involved in the establishment what could be seen as the first Kurdish political party, Kürt Teavün ve Terakki Cemiyeti (translated both as the Society for the Mutual Aid and Progress of Kurdistan and Kurdish Society for Cooperation and Progress), initially as an interest group in Ottoman courts fighting for an autonomous Kurdistan. Abdulqadir himself participated in the Sheikh Said Uprising in Turkey in 1925, but died with the rest of the leaders of the revolt on the gallows.

In these days, Ubeydullah is not as well known among Kurds as he should be, but the name is familiar. His influence had enough of an effect for Mustafa Barzani to name his first born son after him, which was certainly the case among other Kurds too (though unfortunately Ubeydullah Barzani ended up staying with the Ba’ath after the 1975 uprising, and died under mysterious circumstances in Baghdad some years later).

Yezdan Sher and the 1855 Revolt


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Shivan Perwer’s song “Yezdan Sher Beg”

Yezdan Sher (sometimes rendered as Yezdansher, Yezdin Ser, Ezdin Ser, Ezdin Ser Beg, etc.), led what could be seen as a swan song of revolts initiated from Kurdish princes. In my last post about Bedrkhan, the Botan Emirate fought against the Ottoman Empire under the leadership of Bedrkhan, and were beaten by the brutal Ottoman expedition sent against him.

After the fall of Badrkhan in the late 1840s, Yezdan Sher had reign over the remains of the Botan Emirate. Yezdan Sher would enter into direct conflict with the Ottoman Empire in the 1850s, when yet another war with the Russian Empire began.

There are a number of wars that occurred between the Ottoman and Russian Empires in the 19th century, and these wars often had such an effect on the Ottoman Empire to cause instability and provide an opening for attempts to assert greater independence from Istanbul. Like his uncle had down with Ottoman disarray with the revolt of Muhammad Ali (which Mir Kor had also taken advantage of), Yezdan Sher also took advantage of this weakness from the Ottoman Empire. (Un)fortunately for Yezdan Sher, the particular conflict he would rise up was one that would involve powers beyond Russia and Turkey- the year of 1855 was also in the middle of the Crimean War.

The Crimean War saw the conflict between the Ottoman and Russian Empires escalate into one that resulted in the intervention of the British, French, and various other European powers on the side of the Ottomans in order to check Russian expansion and growing strength of the Tsar. In the west, the study of the Crimean War highlights the importance of logistics and tactics, as well as the introduction of various technological advancements. More importantly, it was one of the first wars that received extensive coverage in international press, as well as some of the subject of early photographs. Unfortunately for those interested in what Kurds were doing such treatment was not applied in the events of Yezdan Sher or the front between Russia and Turkey in the Caucasus.

At any rate, the demands the war took on the Ottoman Empire was enough to cause the military to move many garrisons in the area to the frontlines. The vacuum this created resulted in Yezdan Sher to rise up and rally some 2,000 men to his side, where he ejected the Ottoman-appointed governor of Bitlis. As I discussed before, Bitlis was the home of one of the great Kurdish principalities which had sided with Badrkhan in his revolt, only to be destroyed as the Ottomans crushed the old polity. The defeat of an Ottoman garrison rallied Kurdish people to Yezdan Sher’s banner. He marched on garrisons in Siirt, where the Ottoman garrison in the Kurdish region was based; the fall of the garrison (defended by forces from both Siirt and the Baghdad Wali) saw Yezdan Sher come into the possession of arms which enabled him to further his campaign. The size of Yezdan Sher’s forces swelled to 100,000 strong according to some estimates, and had even begun to threaten the major cities of Mosul and Baghdad. Jazira too, the same city he had abandoned before, now was under his control. Much of Ottoman Kurdistan had become unstable and Yezdan Sher was proving to be trouble some for the Ottoman authorities.

A portion of a foreign events section from the New York Daily Times (now the New York Times), on April 14th, 1855. The paper summarizes some foreign events dispatches from mid-February that it has received. The “rebel Kurds” here undoubtedly refer to Yezdan Sher himself as he moved against Mosul. From Proquest Historical Newspapers database.

Another issue of the New York Daily Times in April 1855. This recounts some dispatches shortly after the previous one, where it refers to Kurdistan in “a state of revolt”. “Schamyl” is Imam Shamil, a Muslim leader during their war against Russia in the Caucasus. From Proquest Historical Newspapers database.

From an article in The Independent (a Boston paper) referring to the instability in Ottoman Kurdistan. The “Kurdish Chieftain” is of course Yezdan Sher- the paper naturally brings up the events of the Badrkhan revolt and concerns itself more with the Christians in the region. It is worth noting the paper’s low account of the Ottoman inability to respond to the insurrection. From Proquest Historical Newspapers.

A more detailed account of the revolt by The Independent (Boston paper). It refers to a battle where Ottoman forces defeated Yezdan Sher. The Ottomans of course rarely disclosed defeats but rather victories in battle; the paper even seemingly thinks the revolt is over. It is worth noting that this is one of the few texts that refers to Yezdan Sher in name, along with a tribal ally. From Proquest Historical Newspapers.

For his part Yezdan Sher is believed to have attempted to move himself in league with the Russian Empire, which was fighting in the north in the Bayazid province (which also was home to a good number of Kurds who were in turn fighting the Russians for the Ottoman Empire). Due to the distance and separation between Yezdan Sher in essentially what is the modern-day border region of Turkey and Iraq, such requests was not recognized by the Russian Empire. To the European powers who intervened on the side of the Ottoman Empire, Yezdan Sher could prove to be troublesome. The Russian Empire’s interests in Eastern Anatolia, more specifically Armenia and Kurdistan, could be advanced by a pro-Russian kingdom under the control of Yezdan Sher. With Ottoman armies fighting a pitched war against the Russians along its Caucasus frontier, it threatened to cause further problems for the Ottoman Empire which would not be beneficial to their difficult struggle against Russia in the Crimea and elsewhere.

A response to Yezdan Sher’s rebellion could not be dealt with by the Ottomans beyond a few inconclusive battles, which they had presented as major victories to the press. In reality Yezdan Sher’s strength was such that he had controlled the plains north of Baghdad right up to Lake Van and even Diyarbakir/Amed, and the Ottoman Empire was unable to breakthrough this due to much of their forces tied up in other fronts with the Russian Empire. It was only until the winter of 1855 when Ottoman forces had a reprieve when the fighting entered a lull. Now, the Ottoman Empire and its allies could focus its attention on removing an internal problem in the Ottoman Empire. A direct intervention was decided against, and rather a more ‘diplomatic’, if not deceitful, approach was decided upon. The British Emissary to the Ottomans, Nimrod Rassam, a Christian based out of Mosul, was dispatched with resources to neutralize allies of Yezdan Sher. For Yezdan Sher himself, Rassam promised an audience with the Imperial Court in Istanbul to negotiate a Kurdish state. Yezdan Sher could be seen as naive for seeing such an offer seriously and at face value. For his part, Yezdan Sher had not received any responses from the Russians, and seeing how the Greeks and Egyptians relied on European support against the Ottomans, had thought this was the next approach.

And so Yezdan Sher went with Rassam to Istanbul. Instead of the conference he thought he would get, he was promptly apprehended and imprisoned, where he would die later. Kurdish forces who were told to lay down arms by Rassam did so and ended their revolt. Those who continued ended up as brigands until they too did not become a threat.

Yezdan Sher was indeed the last of the Kurdish ‘princes’ to launch an insurrection. From this point forward, Kurdish culture had returned back to the tribal level which meant a greater influence of religion in their viewpoints, rather than the more accepting and larger worldview of the princes.

Source: A People Without a Country: The Kurds and Kurdistan– The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire Yezdan Sher. Nizam Kendal, Gérard Chaliand.

The downfall of Bedrkhan and the end of Botan


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Three descendents of Mir Badrkhan Beg- Camuran, Sureyya, and Celadat.

Bedrkhan (also written as Badrkhan, Badirkhan, Bader Khan, Baderxan, and so many other ways), a name which elicits different responses from people. For most people in the world it is virtually unknown. Among Kurds though, the name is more well-known, one shrouded in myth though rooted in history, and among others a name of evil and hatred.

Who was Badrkhan? Wikipedia is not too helpful in this regard, only telling the reader that he was a lord of the Botan Emirate, and then pointing to an article going in depth about his massacres of the Christians. This is problematic of many Kurdish-related articles due to there being few ‘neutral’ sources on the Kurdish matter (and those few that are around are discounted as being too pro-Kurdish), while more ‘neutral’ sources tend to derive from uneven treatments of the region that is wholly sympathetic to the christian experience in the Middle-East.

What is known is that Badrkhan ascended to the throne at an early age, sometimes reported to be 18 years old. The rulers of Botan had long been known to be educated and “tolerant” (for the most part), and Badrkhan followed in that tradition. The picture painted here is in sharp contrast to the more brutal one encouraged elsewhere.

It may be recalled that Badrkhan was around in the same time that Mir Kor launched his insurrection against Ottoman authority in his attempt to gain more power among the Kurdish principalities (you can read that up on the post regarding Mir Muhammad). Indeed Badrkhan himself has to face the possibility of conflict with Mir Kor (and in some sources this was said to be the case), but ultimately the two powers settled on a ceasefire. It’s been speculated as to why Badrkhan never joined forces with Mir Kor- the forces Botan and Soran commanded could have been enough to put up good resistance to the Empire. Ultimately it came down to Badrkhan himself, who, understandably, was looking out for his own advancements and would not see himself as beneath Mir Kor.

It seems that Badrkhan was careful to not incur the wrath of the Ottoman Empire, not going in rebellion against the empire and thus avoiding the effects of Raschid Pasha’s campaign in the mid-1830s when the Soran rebellion was being put down. Badrkhan had already made his strength known by pushing his rivals around and making them acknowledge his rule. Like Mir Kor, Badrkhan’s rule began to take the shape of a centralized monarchy rather than a tribal confederation. Of note was Badrkhan’s embrace of Islam, one that he used to force Yezidi tribes to convert, who were then brought into his court as he saw them as more easily managed than his usual retainers.

Badrkhan watched as the provinces around him began to collapse. The Emirates of Soran, Badhinan, and Baban were significantly weakened from Mir Kor’s revolt. The neighboring Hakkari Emirate, long being less strong than its neighbors, was wrought with chaos as tribal chieftains fought one another, and Yezidi and Christian chieftains began to assert their independence from their traditional overlords. With the Ottoman Empire unable to maintain order and fending off advances from an upstart Egypt, the fringes of its empire began to disintegrate.

It is here Badrkhan made his first moves against his rivals, but it would be in neighboring Hakkari where his claim to fame (or infamy, depending on how you see it) would come. Badrkhan was working with the Ottoman Empire during this period, having been relied upon to raise soldiers to fight against the Egyptians in yet another war (what is now commonly called the Second Turko-Egyptian War). On June 24, 1839, the Ottoman military faced a catastrophic defeat at the hands of the Egyptians in Nezib, ending in a rout that created a temporary power vacuum in the eastern parts of the empire. Nezib was close to what is now modern-day Gaziantep, also nearby Badrkhan’s capital at Jazira (Cizre). This provided Badrkhan with the opportunity to flex his authority and begin asserting himself on the other towns. And so his attention turned to Hakkari to the east.

Hakkari was then undergoing a crisis between two notables- the Mir Nur Allah Beg and Suleiman Beg, who was deposed by Nur Allah Beg. Tribes took sides in this conflict, but more importantly it was the Christian community who also took sides. Hakkari had been unique due to the strength of the Nestorian tribes there, including Mar Shinum (the patriarch). There had been a rift between Nur Allah Beg and Mar Shinum, leading to the Mar Shinum to throw his support behind Suleiman Beg. Conversely, rival clerics to Mar Shinum threw their support behind Nur Allah Beg.

Why were the Christian loyalties divided here? From a materialist explanation, we can suggest there is a power struggle that even religious dogma could not resist. There is little attention devoted to the topic- indeed the various editors responsible wikipedia article on the massacres of Badrkhan do not provide any background as to what was occurring with the Christians at this time within the Ottoman Empire and why there had been such divisions emerging between the Christian and Muslim tribes.

The Ottoman Empire by the 1800s was in full decline, and foreign powers were beginning to interfere more and more with its domestic politics, both from within the Sultan’s court and through the disparate Christian groups that existed in the empire. During this time rival missionaries from the various nations of Europe entered in full force into the Christian settlements of the Ottoman Empire, proselytizing aggressively among the Christian tribes and leaders who lived there. On a side note, it would appear that the Anglican church in the UK had been courting Mar Shinum, while their American counterparts had been working among his rivals.

This had the effect of irreversibly disrupting the normal status quo among the people. Tribes who had formerly lived with one another in peace now accused their Christian neighbors of subverting the Caliph’s rule, and so the seeds of mistrust were sown. Notably in 1837 during Raschid Pasha’s campaign through the region as he marched against the princes at Amedi in Badhinan, Mar Shinum had sent aid to the prince there, only to back off at the last minute out of encouragement from the Mosul Beg. This led to distrust between Nur Allah Beg over whether or not Mar Shinum would too abandon him. And in time, he did, favoring Suleiman’s (rightful) place on the throne.

Chaos had begun to spread in Hakkari uncontrollably, and Badrkhan saw his opportunity to finally assert his strength there where it had previously been repulsed by then the united Christian and Muslim tribes there. Now Nur Allah Beg was moved to call upon the stronger Botan Emirate for aid, and Badrkhan responded. On their side would be friendly Muslim tribes, as well as Christian groups who were opposed to Mar Shinum, notably the Tkhuma tribe from the Tiyari confederation/region in Hakkari. Despite this, the conflict is still whittled down into Badr Khan killing all Christians. But I digress.

This was a classic power struggle- though some might try to paint it as simply a case of Muslims hating Christians, the reality was much more complex. It can not be denied though that during his campaigns against the Christians in 1843 and 1846, Badrkhan’s forces killed hundreds if not thousands of Christians in the region who were fighting against Nur Allah Beg. In the second invasion, Badrkhan turned against the Christians who were formerly allied to him after they quit supporting him and paying taxes and providing other material, possibly due to missionary influence. International media would take notice of these killings and European audiences were treated to sensationalist accounts of Badrkhan’s rampage against the Nestorian tribes and it moved the governments of those countries to respond to their population’s demands. More importantly, it provided them with yet more leverage to use against the weakening Ottoman Empire.

An account from the New York Observer of the “Nestorian Massacre” in the Hakkari area, January of 1847. This appears to have been written in response to Badrkhan’s 1846 campaign. Found through the Proquest Historical Newspapers database.

An article from the “Anglo-American Journal” in a section devoted to foreign events. Here Badrkhan is referenced, and makes notice of the Ottoman Empire’s promise to foreign powers of retribution towards Badr Khan. Found through the Proquest Historical Newspapers database.

These accounts were very sensationalized, as one can expect from media coverage of foreign events. Regardless, the Ottoman Empire did get enough pressure from overseas to muster an army to respond to Badrkhan’s “massacres”. It is important to note in this respect though that even when the Ottoman Empire was well aware of the first massacres, they did not respond to them. In a way they had given Badrkhan room to do so in order to weaken the Nestorian tribes; the inevitable European outcry would then present the opportunity for the Ottomans to kill two birds with one stone- cutting into what were two very troublesome groups for the empire.

By this point Badrkhan’s revolt and massacres had encouraged other chieftains to join with him, notably the rulers of Bitlis, Mukus, and several tribes in the Hakkari and Van region. Like Mir Kor before him, the rebellion was beginning to get to such a point that the Ottoman Empire could not afford to ignore it any longer. The aspect of intervening to stop a massacre would be useful for its justifications in destroying the emirs strength in the east and the beginning of centralization later on.

The first force sent against Badrkhan was defeated, further encouraging Badrkhan to celebrate his power and independence from Istanbul, supposedly even minting coins in his name. The second invasion force however was much larger and managed to eject Badrkhan and his forces from the capital at Jazira. The Ottomans were able to beat out the Botan Emirate both by numbers and being able to surround and cut off its source of supplies.

He later went through an eight month siege at a nearby fortress at Eruh/Dihe, north of Jazira, but soon capitulated. Badrkhan, along with his family, was sent  into exile first at Varna in Ottoman Bulgaria, and later to the island of Crete. He would finally be confined in Damascus later on, where he died in 1868. His children would however go on to do important things- indeed the Badrkhan name would come up many times in the Kurdish struggle, which I will get to later.

Soon afterwards the campaign against Badrkhan evolved into a larger one that would essentially end the Kurdish emirates. His allies in Van were put down and the leader there, Khan Mahmud of Mukus, was captured and later killed from torture. In Bitlis, Sharif Beg was defeated and put into exile. Nur Allah Beg, the Mir of Hakkari who had called on Badrkhan in the first place, was exiled. Other princes in the region were eventually made to surrender to the Empire as it set out to end the ‘instability’ in the region, ending with the Baban Emirate at Sulaymaniyah, where it stood down without a fight in 1850. Beginning with the Baban revolt of Abdurrahman Pasha at the opening of the 18th century, the Ottoman attempts to assert themselves finally over the Kurdish kingdoms took 40 years. Of note would be the consequences of missionary activity here. Armenian groups from this point forward would continue to strengthen their ties with the Russian Empire, which would exacerbate tensions for sometime between them and their Kurdish neighbors, leading to massacres in the 1890s and the genocide in World War I.

It was not an effective end of trouble from the Kurds though, for the Ottomans would struggle to find a substitute for the Emirates that would ensure the loyalty of Kurdish tribes to the Sultan. By then, it would already be too late.

1905, Birca Belek

1905, remains of Birca Belek, Badrkhan’s palace.